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Abstract 
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, a new form of microfinance, has been touted as to its 
prominent potential for reducing world poverty. Although a growing body of IS 
research has been devoted to examining online P2P lending, how such platforms 
actually make a difference in curbing poverty has yet to be fully explored. The Ebola 
outbreak of 2014 provides us a unique empirical opportunity to explore such broader 
impacts of online P2P lending. Leveraging this event as a natural experiment, we 
investigate how the demand and supply sides of P2P lending platforms react to an 
unpredictable crisis. Employing a difference-in-difference identification strategy with 
data from Kiva.org, we conduct country- and loan-level estimations. Preliminary 
results show upward trends on both demand and supply sides of P2P lending; 
borrowers request more financial capital and lenders are more active in their lending 
behaviors in the post-crisis period. We extend online P2P lending literature by 
investigating the influences of “off-platform” shocks on within-platform behaviors.  
Keywords:  Online Peer-to-Peer Lending, Crisis Response, Prosocial Behavior, Online 
Microfinance, Difference-in-Difference  
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Introduction 
Securing capital investments has become a challenging but crucial part of entrepreneurial processes 
(Allison et al. 2013; Cassar 2004; Yang and Hahn 2015). In developing countries, this challenge is even 
more pronounced given the lack of availability and accessibility of traditional sources of funding such as 
venture capital, business angels and banks (Pissarides 1999). Microfinance has emerged as a viable 
alternative for supplying critical financial capital to microenterprises, especially to those in impoverished 
districts (Dorado 2001). Recent statistics show that, in recent years, microfinance has issued more than 
$25 billion in loans to over 150 million individuals (Moss et al. 2015).  
Recently, a novel type of online microfinance, in the form of online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, has 
started to allow microlenders to break loans into multiple smaller loans and then to market them to 
individuals (Galak et al. 2011). Online P2P lending platforms, such as Kiva.org (henceforth, Kiva), which 
typically operate on the Internet, enable individual non-specialized lenders (i.e., the general public) to 
provide small loans for those entrepreneurs in need. This new business model helps needy entrepreneurs 
to directly tap the crowd as a source of funding. It is thus also be viewed as “crowd-empowered 
microfinance” (Marom 2013). Since its inception in 2005, up to mid 2016, Kiva has helped more than 1.9 
million borrowers receive a total of $893 million for their small businesses.1 In fact, online P2P lending 
has played a leading role in reducing world poverty (Galak et al. 2011). As Kiva states, its mission is to 
connect people through lending to alleviate poverty (Waghorn 2013).  
Given its salient socio-economic impacts, a nascent stream of research has begun to investigate this 
phenomenon. By and large, academic evaluation to date has largely focused on the impacts of within-
platform factors, such as features of entrepreneurial narratives (Allison et al. 2015), on funding 
performance or on lenders’ decisions about which borrowers to support. However, little is known about 
the role of P2P lending platforms in addressing broader (off-platform) social problems. Specifically, it 
remains enigmatic how the emergence of this new business model influences extreme poverty, which is 
actually directly related to the purpose of microfinance. Indeed, scholars have recently articulated the 
importance of understanding the interplay between online microfinance platforms and social welfare 
(Agrawal et al. 2013).  
The recent outbreak of the Ebola virus in Western Africa, although tragic in terms of mass casualties, 
provides us a unique context to explore such broader impacts of online P2P lending platforms. Disease 
crises and natural disasters, like the Ebola outbreak, have become one of the major obstacles for reducing 
extreme poverty, as they exert detrimental impacts on social welfare and economic growth (Hochrainer 
2009; Von Peter et al. 2012). As reports show, the explosion of the Ebola disease has dramatically affected 
the operations of local businesses, employment rates, overall incomes as well as the demand for goods and 
services (Wood 2014). Entrepreneurs may resort to online platforms to acquire critical capital to help 
their small businesses survive the disaster. Investigating how online P2P lending reacts to crises such as 
the Ebola outbreak facilitates a better understanding of how online microfinance may help to address 
important social issues. Specifically, this study examines this impact from both demand and supply sides 
of the platform and explores how, and to what extent, the outbreak of a crisis influences borrowers’ and 
lenders’ behaviors in online peer-to-peer lending.  
We empirically examine this question using data from Kiva, the world’s largest online P2P lending 
platform. By employing identification strategies using propensity score matching and difference-in-
difference estimations, we conduct country- and loan-level analysis. Preliminary results suggest that there 
were upward trends on both demand and supply sides of P2P lending after the Ebola outbreak. On the 
demand side, the increase is driven by higher requested loan amount. On the supply side, the increase 
arises from the enhanced activeness of lenders, resulting in a significant increase in daily funding amount. 
Further falsification tests and robustness checks suggest that our results are robust to different estimation 
time windows and alternative explanations. The findings suggest that the Ebola virus outbreak has 
induced more prosocial lending activities on the P2P lending platform, and this lending behavior is 
primarily motivated by altruism (Simon 1993) – the willingness to help those in need. Our study extends 
the extant literature in online P2P lending by documenting robust empirical evidence of how this new 
business model reacts to poverty and increases financial inclusion.  
                                                             
1 See: http://www.kiva.org/about/stats (visited in September 2016) 
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Related Literature 
Crisis Response 
During the past decade, crisis related studies have garnered substantial academic attention (e.g., Berg and 
Schrader 2012; Dayton 2004; Phan and Airoldi 2015; Tim et al. 2013). A series of crises or disasters have 
exerted prolonged and devastating impacts on a variety of socio-economic conditions (Hosono et al. 2012; 
Laframboise and Loko 2012). At the macro level, existing studies suggest that disasters have a 
significantly detrimental impact on real GDP and economic growth (Hochrainer 2009; Von Peter et al. 
2012). At the micro level, it has been shown that stakeholders suffer from business interruptions, lowered 
personal incomes or even extreme poverty. In general, the detrimental impacts on developing countries 
are more devastating compared to those on developed nations (Laframboise and Loko 2012).  
Apart from their socio-economic impacts, crises are widely believed to exert severe financial impacts on 
society, particularly on firms’ and individuals’ financing behaviors (Benson and Clay 2004). Some 
relevant studies investigated the changes of loan demand after natural disasters such as volcanic 
eruptions (Berg and Schrader 2012) and floods (Del Ninno et al. 2003). They find that while credit 
demand increases after such crises, access to lending remains restricted. Even though the financing 
market has been shown to react to unpredicted shocks (e.g., crises/disaster), there is still a lack of 
comprehensive understanding about the changes in financial behaviors and the reactions of financial 
markets in response to such unpredicted exogenous shocks. Our study therefore aims to examine how the 
demand and supply sides of the lending market change as a result of unpredictable disasters.  
Microfinance and Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Our study is also related to the literature on microfinance. Microfinance, the “open access to capital for 
individuals previously shut out of financial services” (Khavul 2010, p.58), has been increasingly viewed as 
a powerful means to alleviate poverty and reduce social exclusion (Moss et al. 2015). Traditionally, 
entrepreneurs gain access to financial capital primarily through financial institutions. But financial 
institutions, especially those in the developing world, find it risky and expensive to serve the poor, as the 
poor are often illiterate, do not have officially available credit scores and are often dispersed across rural 
geographic regions (Khavul 2010).  Furthermore, they usually operate as small-scale businesses (Webb et 
al. 2009), which often entail agency and transaction cost problems that are not easy for traditional banks 
to overcome. Fortunately, microfinance offers an innovative solution for entrepreneurs by resolving 
problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and transaction costs to a great extent (Khavul 2010).  
The recent emergence of online peer-to-peer lending (Galak et al. 2011) enables microlenders to break 
loans into multiple smaller loans and then to market them to the general public (Allison et al. 2013; Galak 
et al. 2011). Facilitated by the Internet, online microfinance taps “the crowd” as a source of funding 
(Duncan 2014; Marom 2013) by mobilizing a large community (i.e., the crowd) to give small amounts of 
money to ventures and initiatives they find attractive. The sum of small contributions may add up to a 
sum that is substantial enough for business start-ups.  
Recently, a growing body of IS research has begun to examine this phenomenon. In general, there have 
been two streams of studies – 1) studies investigating potential drivers of funding success and loan 
performance, and 2) those that investigate motivations and determinants of lenders’ contribution 
behaviors. In the first stream, several studies have focused on the influences of entrepreneurial narratives 
on fundraising outcome. Entrepreneurs’ behavioral intentions (Moss et al. 2015), valence (Allison et al. 
2013) and language framing (Allison et al. 2015) of entrepreneurial narratives have been found to be 
associated with loan performance. For instance, Moss et al. (2015) found that those narratives that signal 
competitive aggressiveness and risk-taking are inclined to receive more funding and also at higher 
funding speeds. Allison et al. (2013) showed that entrepreneurial narratives indicating blame and concern 
result in more rapid funding speeds than those indicating accomplishment. In the second stream, studies 
primarily examined the impacts of prior contributions and characteristics of borrowers on lenders’ 
decisions about which borrowers to support. Geography and culture have been considered to be two 
major relevant characteristics, and these two characteristics have also been prevalently discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2011; Burtch et al. 2014). Galak et al. (2011) suggest that 
the social distance between borrowers and lenders also plays a role in lenders’ decisions. In addition, 
Zhang and Liu (2012) found that higher prior contributions are likely to attract more subsequent lenders 
as a result of herding behaviors.  
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As can be seen, the existing online P2P lending literature mainly concentrates on the impacts of within-
platform factors on funding performance and lenders’ decision-making. Amongst these works, little 
consideration has been given to the broader off-platform effects, such as the explosion of unpredictable 
crises and social problems, on within-platforms behaviors which are more relevant since the primary aim 
of online microfinance is to alleviate poverty and increase social welfare especially in developing countries 
by connecting geographically separated individuals through online lending (Waghorn 2013). But no prior 
work has considered the role of online P2P lending platforms in overall poverty reduction. In particular, it 
still remains unclear how borrowers and lenders alter their behaviors in response to unpredicted crises 
that exacerbate extreme poverty.  Our study offers a step forward in this regard by assessing how the 
outbreak of an unpredicted disaster (i.e., the Ebola outbreak) affects online P2P lending. Specifically, we 
investigate this effect from both the demand and supply sides of the platform. Investigating this question 
enriches our understanding of the role of online P2P lending platforms in affecting socio-economic 
conditions.  
Methods 
Study Context & Data 
Kiva is the largest online P2P lending platform that provides loans to small businesses, which to a large 
extent, are located in developing countries. Kiva has the mission to alleviate poverty, increase social 
welfare, and minimize social exclusion by ensuring access to credit. Kiva collaborates with local micro-
financial institutions (MFI) within each country to fulfill their mission. Borrowers on Kiva can be 
entrepreneurs, small businesses or microenterprises. Local MFI act as the mediation between potential 
borrowers and Kiva. MFI work directly with local ventures. They are responsible for working directly with 
borrowers to service the loans (Moss et al. 2015). Local MFI assist borrowers in creating their own 
profiles, which are then submitted to Kiva. The profile generally includes both soft and hard information 
about the borrowers, such as their biography, purpose of loan,2 requested loan amount, repayment 
schedule and information about the corresponding local MFI (Burtch et al. 2014). Funding amount 
provided by each lender typically start from $25 onwards. Each loan has a predetermined funding 
duration to reach the required funding amount. Lenders do not earn any interest on the funds they supply 
on Kiva.  
Our data is retrieved using the public API provided by Kiva. Our data consists of three parts: information 
on the loans, the borrowers and the lenders. Loan information includes loan location (i.e., country), 
image, sector, usage, delinquency indicator, geographic location, loan amount, lender count, posted date, 
expiration date, paid date and loan description (the narrative). Borrower information includes name, 
gender and profile picture. Lender information includes the name, picture, occupation, loan reason and 
the number of loans to which they have previously contributed.  
In 2014, the outbreak of the Ebola virus in Western Africa was the largest and most complex in the history 
of the disease (Alexander et al. 2014). This outbreak resulted in a great number of casualties primarily in 
three countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. On August 8, 2014, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) designated the Western African outbreak as a Public Health Emergence of International Concern 
(PHEIC). After that, the number of Ebola cases in the three affected countries increased dramatically. By 
the end of July 2015, there were no vaccines licensed for the use in humans to protect against the Ebola 
Virus Disease (Callaway 2015). The Ebola outbreak has exerted severe socio-economic impacts on affected 
areas, especially Liberia and Sierra Leone, in part because the disease took hold in densely populated 
areas. Various sectors, ranging from agriculture to services, have also been hit hard by this crisis. The 
disease affected operations of local businesses, employment rates, incomes and demand for goods and 
services (Wood 2014). In light of the unique scope and scale of impact, we employ this event as a natural 
experiment to explore variations in borrowers’ and lenders’ financial behaviors and in turn to understand 
the broader impacts of online P2P lending.  
Crisis Explosion & Peer-to-Peer Lending 
In the emergence of an unpredictable crisis, we expect two plausible effects on the demand (borrower) 
                                                             
2 Kiva hosts 15 loan sectors including agriculture, clothing, housing, education, health, transportation, personal use, services, 
manufacturing, arts, entertainment, retail, wholesale and construction. Each loan is posted to the sector most related to its purpose. 
 The Role of P2P Lending in Crisis Response 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 5 
 
 
side of online P2P lending. On the one hand, our review of the literature and basic intuition would suggest 
that a crisis outbreak would dramatically worsen economic conditions and disrupt normal operations of 
local small businesses in sectors, such as agriculture, food, health and services. Entrepreneurs in crisis-hit 
areas would be exposed to economic disruptions and increased operational risks. Faced with this adverse 
shock, borrowers may be in need of liquidity and therefore increase their demand for loans. A greater 
amount of financial capital would be needed to assist their businesses in surviving through such a crisis. 
Given this risk effect, we expect an increase in loan demand after the outbreak of an unpredictable crisis.  
On the other hand, crises also pose a health threat on entrepreneurs. Severely affected districts are 
exposed to market closures and entrepreneurs in these areas may find it difficult to continue their 
operations and may choose to temporarily suspend them. This would lead to a decline in their economic 
activities and in turn reduces their demand for loans. Thus, loan demand may also decrease after a crisis.  
The economics literature has typically attributed contribution behavior to altruistic or egoistic motives 
(Allison et al. 2013; Simon 1993). Altruistically-motivated giving is primary driven by the willingness to 
help , whereas egoistically-motivated giving is mainly driven by external returns (e.g., financial interest). 
On Kiva, lenders do not receive any interest on the funds they lend to borrowers (Galak et al. 2011). In 
other words, their lending behaviors cannot be motivated by financial returns (Allison et al. 2013). The 
contribution behaviors can be seen as a form of prosocial lending (Allison et al. 2015). This motive also 
naturally fits the explanations of warm-glow-motivated giving (Andreoni 1990).  
A crisis outbreak threatens social welfare and the economic conditions of affected areas. Business 
operations in affected areas are likely to be undermined by the deteriorating macroeconomic condition. 
The worsened situation may influence individual lenders’ decisions by increasing the warm glow felt as a 
result of lending. Prosocial lending, a form of altruistic behavior, is mainly motivated by lenders’ desire to 
help others. Taking actions to help those in need provides them with a positive affective state. In this 
regard, a crisis outbreak is expected to increase prosocial lending behaviors (Andreoni 1990; Cialdini et al. 
1973). Besides, the decision making literature suggests the “identified victim effect” (Kogut and Ritov 
2005a; Kogut and Ritov 2005b), which means people are more inclined to support a victim if she is 
identified compared to if she is unidentified. A crisis outbreak may arouse empathic emotions towards 
borrowers from affected areas, since people are likely to imagine how people are struggling to overcome 
the current crisis (Davis 1994). This is likely to evoke empathy, which induces them to help those 
“identified victims” (Batson et al. 1991; Batson et al. 1995). Based on the above, we expect an increase in 
the supply side of online P2P lending whereby lenders are more inclined to offer loans to borrowers in 
crisis-affected areas. However, the crisis response literature suggests that disasters are likely to induce a 
higher default rate for loans (Berg and Schrader 2012). Crises dramatically threaten the businesses of 
local entrepreneurs, which may in turn lead to an increase in delinquency rate. Even though the lending 
behavior on Kiva is a form of prosocial lending (i.e., no interest rate), borrowers need to pay back the 
loans following a certain repayment schedule. Therefore, in the post-crisis period, lenders are also 
exposed to increased risks arising from potential higher delinquency and default rates. This risk effect 
may reduce lenders’ propensity to help. Given this argument, we also expect a decrease in the supply side 
of online P2P lending. Due to the dual potential effects based upon the existing literature, we examine the 
overall impacts empirically.  
Identification: Difference-in-Difference Approach 
The outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in Western Africa provides us a unique context to explore such 
broader impacts of online P2P lending platforms. We employ a difference-in-difference (DID) approach 
to estimate the changes in P2P lending after Ebola outbreak. Since the Ebola outbreak was formally 
designated by the WHO on 8 August 2014 as a PHEIC, we take August 2014 as the event month. We 
investigate its impact within a 9-month window, with April to July as the pre-Ebola period and September 
to December as the post-Ebola period. We also include the sample in the event month (i.e., August).  
The Ebola outbreak occurred in three Western African countries including Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea, but only two of them are available on Kiva. Therefore, our treatment group includes the two 
Ebola-affected countries: Liberia and Sierra Leone. To evaluate a before-after effect, we select countries 
that were not affected by Ebola outbreak in our dataset as the control group. However, countries (as well 
as loans in these countries) that were not affected by Ebola may have different characteristics with the 
countries (and loans) in the treatment group. These country level factors may affect lenders’ behaviors 
regarding the loans in specific countries, which can undermine the assumptions of DID. In order to 
alleviate such potential endogeneity issues, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to find other 
countries to form the control group. In the first stage, we estimate a Probit model to calculate the 
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propensity score. The dependent variable in the Probit model is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
country is affected by Ebola, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are socio-economic factors that 
are likely to affect the Ebola outbreak in a certain country, including Sanitation (i.e., the percentage of the 
population with access to improved sanitization facilities), Water (i.e., the percentage of the population 
with access to improved water sources), Livestock (i.e., the livestock production index), and Population 
(i.e., the annual increase in the urban population). We derive these data for each county and each month 
from the World Bank’s World Development Index 2014. These independent variables are considered as 
the potential factors that are associated with the outbreak of Ebola (Alexander et al. 2014). Such a 
procedure allows us to select similar countries that had a high chance of being affected by Ebola but were 
not affected into the control group. 
The matching method we use is nearest neighbor matching. The result shows that the matching procedure 
resulted in two groups that were comparable on most observable accounts, indicating satisfactory 
matching. The control group we find through PSM includes one country: Togo. Both countries in the 
treatment group are matched with this country using nearest neighbor matching. This selected country is 
also located in Western Africa. We therefore use loans in Togo as the control group to estimate the 
changes in loans in the affected countries after the Ebola outbreak.  
Before our regression analyses, to generate an intuition about the changes of loan count after Ebola 
outbreak, we plotted the number of initiated loans in each month for the three countries (see Figure 1). As 
shown in Figure 1, before the Ebola outbreak, changes in number of loans for the three countries roughly 
follow a common trend (Angrist and Pischke 2008). We also notice that the number of loans in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia decrease dramatically after the event, whereas in Togo, the count increases slightly. 
The graph shows that there is a decrease in the demand side of P2P lending in terms of number of loans in 
the post-Ebola period, implying a series of potential impacts on platform response from the Ebola 
outbreak.  
Figure 1. Number of Loans Before and After Ebola Outbreak 
 
Next, utilizing the difference-in-difference approach, we conduct two sets of regression analyses at 
country and loan levels, respectively. First, following the evidence shown in Figure 1, we examine the 
macro impact of Ebola at the country level where country-month is the unit of analysis. Second, we 
perform regression analysis with loans as the unit of analysis to generate a nuanced insight for its impact. 
We estimate the effects on the demand and supply sides of P2P lending. Within our analysis window, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Togo have 27 country-month pairs as well as 1451, 1074 and 774 loans 
respectively. The basic econometric model specification is:  
 LoanIndicators = β0 + β1PostEbola + β2Treatment + β3Interaction+CONTROL+α + µ  
where the LoanIndicators represents demand side or supply side loan indicators. PostEbola equals to 1 if 
the month is August or after, and 0 otherwise. Treatment is equal to 1 if the country or the borrower’s 
country is an Ebola-affected country (i.e., Liberia or Sierra Leone), and 0 otherwise (i.e., Togo). 
Interaction is the multiplication between PostEbola and Treatment. The coefficient of interest is β3, 
which captures the difference between treatment and control group that is induced by Ebola in the post-
Ebola period – i.e., the effect we intend to estimate.  
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Preliminary Results 
Our estimations are conducted by utilizing dependent variables representing the demand and supply sides 
of P2P lending. At country level, the number of loans posted (LoanCount) and average loan amounts for 
all launched loans (AveLoanAmount) in a certain month and certain country are used for the demand 
side, while average funded amount (AveFundedAmount), average number of lenders (AveLenderCount), 
average funded amount per lender (AvePerLender) and average funded amount per day (AvePerDay) 
across all loans in a certain month and certain country are examined for the supply side. Month and 
country fixed effects are also included given our 9 months’ window. For the loan-level analysis, on the 
demand side, the requested loan amount by borrowers (LoanAmount) is used. On the supply side, the 
funded amount (FundedAmount), the number of lenders (LenderCount), the average funded amount per 
lender (AvePerLender), and the average daily funded amount (AvePerDay) are used. Besides, a series of 
loan level characteristics are included in the loan-level estimations to control for loan-specific factors. 
Table 1. Regression Results for Country Level Analysis 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
VARIABLES LoanCount AveLoanAmount AveFundedAmount AveLenderCount AvePerLender AvePerDay 
Post Ebola 0.503 -0.469** -0.461** -0.407* -0.0764 -0.119 
 (0.470) (0.182) (0.183) (0.198) (0.123) (0.313) 
Treated 
countries 
1.858*** -0.0929 -0.102 -0.0687 -0.101 -0.0832 
(0.271) (0.124) (0.123) (0.132) (0.0631) (0.234) 
Interaction 
term 
-2.539*** 1.004*** 0.996*** 0.929*** 0.0786 0.617* 
(0.506) (0.204) (0.202) (0.202) (0.0901) (0.325) 
Constant 3.923*** 6.250*** 6.241*** 2.734*** 3.676*** 5.120*** 
 (0.340) (0.110) (0.107) (0.118) (0.0553) (0.252) 
R2 0.780 0.882 0.881 0.866 0.442 0.549 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: 1) The log form of all dependent variables are used in the estimations to account for their skewed distributions; 2) Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 1 presents our country level estimations. For the demand side, in Model 1, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative and significant (β=-2.539, p<0.01), suggesting that the of number of loans 
posted decreases significantly in the Ebola-affected countries after the outbreak, consistent with the 
evidence in Figure 1. But the amount of needed funds set by borrowers in the treatment group increases 
after the crisis, as shown by the positive interaction term in Model 2 (β=1.004, p<0.01). Model 3-6 show 
the results of the supply side, where lenders tend to be more active in supporting the loans. The average 
amount funded (Model 3), average number of lenders (Model 4) and average speed of funding (Model 6) 
in the treatment group countries increase, while average funded amount of each lender (Model 5) is not 
affected by the event. These macro level results suggest that borrowers tend to seek more funds, while 
lenders actively and timely react to the crisis by providing their support. 
We then conduct a more nuanced analysis at the loan level to examine the impacts on individual loans. 
The results of our loan-level estimations are presented in Table 2 and do not deviate from our country 
level analysis. Model 7 shows the result for the demand side, and Model 8 to 11 show the results for the 
supply side. For the demand side, the results suggest that the outbreak of Ebola is associated with an 
increase in borrowers’ requested loan amounts, suggesting that borrowers need more financial capital for 
their small businesses after the disease outbreak (Model 7: Interaction: β=1.442, p<0.01). It seems 
because the crisis dramatically threatens the performance of local businesses and they are in desperate 
need of extra financial resources to survive, consistent with our arguments about the risk effect on 
borrowers.  
In the supply side, the outbreak of Ebola triggers an increase in the supply side of P2P lending, which 
exhibits as higher funded amounts (Model 8: Interaction: β=1.386, p<0.01), greater number of lenders 
(Model 9: Interaction: β=1.221, p<0.01), and higher daily funded amounts (Model 11: Interaction: 
β=0.299, p<0.01). But average lending amount by individuals does not show a significant increase (Model 
10: Interaction: β=0.0510, ns). The results suggest that even though the Ebola crisis may increase 
delinquency and default rates, this risk effect was not dominant. A possible reason is that in microlending 
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platforms , especially at Kiva which mainly targets entrepreneurs and small businesses, lending behavior 
is predominantly driven by altruistic motives (Allison et al. 2013). In other words, the primary motivation 
for lending is that lenders want to take actions to help those in need. The Ebola outbreak undermines the 
economic situation in the affected districts, which induces a growth in prosocial lending. Furthermore, the 
increased daily amount confirms that the outbreak of crisis prompts lenders to be more active. This is also 
consistent with the finding in the finance literature that people prefer to approach desirable outcomes 
early (Benzion et al. 1989). The crisis outbreak may have aroused empathic emotions and lenders may 
have been more inclined respond to affected borrowers faster with an expectation of helping them recover 
early.  
Table 2. Regression Results for Loan Level Analysis 
 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 
VARIABLES LoanAmount FundedAmount LenderCount AvePerLender AvePerDay 
Post Ebola -1.542*** -1.484*** -1.401*** 0.115* -0.148 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.129) (0.0615) (0.135) 
Treated countries -0.772*** -0.808*** -0.730*** -0.0371 -0.141* 
(0.0564) (0.0563) (0.0582) (0.0345) (0.0753) 
Interaction term 1.442*** 1.386*** 1.221*** 0.0510 0.299*** 
(0.0678) (0.0757) (0.0694) (0.0407) (0.0862) 
Constant 5.709*** 5.790*** 2.246*** 3.820*** 2.973*** 
 (0.255) (0.255) (0.270) (0.162) (0.245) 
R2 0.455 0.409 0.382 0.021 0.187 
Observations 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299 
Notes: 1) Loan characteristics, sector dummies, month dummies and country dummies are included in our estimations. The results 
remain consistent when we hierarchically include the control variables; 2) the log form of all dependent variables are used in the 
estimations to account for their skewed distributions; 3) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
To further verify the responses to Ebola outbreak, we also conducted PSM at loan level where we matched 
loans that were not posted in Ebola-affected countries but with similar loan characteristics (i.e., loan level 
control variables). The matching was performed separately on the loans before and after the Ebola 
outbreak. Similar loans in Western Africa countries except Sierra Leone and Liberia were selected into 
control group using the nearest neighbor matching. The estimations of the new sample (2525 loans in 
each group) are presented at Table 3. From Model 12 to Model 16, the results (Interaction term) are 
consistent with the estimates in Table 3. These results validate our loan level analysis and provide 
stronger evidence for our findings. 
Table 3. Regression Results for Loan Level Analysis with Loan-level PSM 
 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 
VARIABLES LoanAmount FundedAmount LenderCount AvePerLender AvePerDay 
Post Ebola -0.738*** -0.755*** -0.668*** 0.00208 -0.204 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.148) (0.0698) (0.164) 
Treated countries 0.970*** 1.037*** 0.672*** 0.170*** 0.872*** 
(0.0706) (0.0809) (0.0672) (0.0500) (0.111) 
Interaction term 1.076*** 1.104*** 0.949*** 0.0526 0.317*** 
(0.0550) (0.0720) (0.0548) (0.0420) (0.0778) 
Constant 4.825*** 4.773*** 1.732*** 3.412*** 2.767*** 
 (0.313) (0.319) (0.296) (0.146) (0.327) 
R2 0.600 0.563 0.511 0.032 0.278 
Observations 5,050 5,050 5,050 5,050 5,050 
Notes: 1) Loan characteristics, sector dummies, month dummies and country dummies are included in our estimations. The results 
remain consistent when we hierarchically include the control variables; 2) the log form of all dependent variables are used in the 
estimations to account for their skewed distributions; 3) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
We also conducted additional falsification tests and robustness checks. A potential concern one might 
raise is that the country chosen for the control group is not a good match. That is, there may be error in 
the matching process and perhaps the results are only showing spurious correlations. Therefore, we 
conducted a falsification test by replacing the two Ebola-affected countries with other randomly selected 
countries but keeping Togo as the control group. The insignificant results in the falsification test show 
that our results are valid and robust. This gives us confidence that our identification strategy for the 
changes in borrowers’ and lenders’ behaviors is appropriate and that our findings are not the result of 
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spurious associations. In addition, we conducted three sets of analyses to rule out alternative explanations 
by possible shocks across time. First, we exclude all loans whose funding periods are coincided with the 
Ebola outbreak. Second, we exclude all the loans that are posted within the month when the Ebola 
emerged. Third, we use different time windows in our estimations. Instead of using 9 months’ time 
window, we run the analysis with 7 months’ time window (3 months before + 3 months after + event 
month). All tests resulted in similar significance levels and identical directions of all relevant coefficients.  
Conclusions and Expected Contributions 
In this study, employing the Ebola outbreak as a natural experiment and with data from Kiva, we 
investigate the changes in borrowers’ and lenders’ behaviors on P2P lending platforms before and after a 
crisis. We find empirical evidence of increases in both demand and supply sides of P2P lending after the 
crisis outbreak. Specifically, on the demand side, the increase is due to higher loan amount. Even though 
there is a significant decline in the loan count, for those borrowers who still initiate their loans in the post-
Ebola period, they need more financial capital for their businesses. On the supply side, the Ebola outbreak 
induced lenders to respond more actively, resulting in higher daily funding amounts for loans that were 
posted after the event.  
Our study extends IS literature on online P2P lending by investigating the influences of “off-platform” 
shocks (e.g., the Ebola disease outbreak) on within-platform behaviors. This is particularly important 
because the primary purpose of online microfinance platforms is to alleviate poverty and increase social 
welfare. Disease crises and natural disasters have become one of the major causes of intensified poverty. 
Investigating how external crises alter borrowers’ and lenders’ behaviors facilitates a better understanding 
of the role and potential of P2P lending in reducing world poverty and addressing social problems. In 
addition, the prior online P2P lending literature has primarily focused on the impacts from within-
platform factors, such as borrowers’ characteristics, on lending decisions. Our study suggests that offline 
factors play an important role in lenders’ decision making about which borrowers to support. Since 
microlending is mainly altruistically motivated, the “willingness to help” acts as a primary driver for 
lending behavior. Our results show that offline conditions (e.g., unexpected crisis, economic conditions) 
play a prominent role in influencing lending behaviors.  
Practically, we offer implications for online P2P lending platform design. These platforms are encouraged 
to increase the exposure of certain loans whose borrowers are in urgent need (e.g., loans from the 
disaster-hit countries). Since prosocial lending is dominant on this platform, the high exposure of certain 
loans induces lenders to contribute more actively to those borrowers in need. This also facilitates them to 
better address the broader socio-economic problems and in turn to fulfill their mission more effectively.  
Our on-going research extends the current work by pursuing several directions. First, our current focus is 
on the reactions of borrowers and lenders on the platform. The initial evidence prompts us to seek more 
evidence from multiple channels to understand the role of P2P lending platforms in crisis response from a 
broader perspective. Second, we find out that altruistic lending is prevalent on Kiva. That is, lenders’ 
contributions are mainly driven by their willingness to help those in need. Still, lenders’ motivations are 
mixed and they would react differently in the disease outbreak. In our future work, we intend to delve into 
the behaviors of different lenders to examine who played the key roles in crisis response. This will help us 
to understand the mechanism behind the role of P2P lending platforms. Third, we currently estimate the 
effects on the demand and supply sides separately. Given the simultaneity and interplay between the two 
sides of P2P lending platform, our future research will enrich our estimation approach by adopting 
systems of simultaneous equations and structural analysis (Porter 1983) to evaluate the effects together.  
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